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A PROPOSAL TO CAP TORT 
LIABILITY: A VOIDING THE 
PITFALLS OF HEIGHTENED 
RATIONALITY 
In a nation dependent upon liability protection, dramatic and 
highly publicized increases in the cost of insurance have created 
a difficult situation for many members of society. 1 Manufactur-
ers are abandoning entire product lines,2 workers are struggling 
to find day-care services for their children,3 producers of lifesav-
ing vaccines are discontinuing production,' and government en-
tities are foregoing liability coverage-all as a result of ex-
traordinary rises in insurance premiums.'~ 
Constituents have besieged state and federal lawmakers with 
demands for immediate action against the spreading crisis. Leg-
islators have reacted by statutorily limiting the noneconomic 
damages that a plaintiff can recover in a legal action. 6 In view of 
1. See Gest & Work, Sky-High Damage Suits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 27, 
1986, at 35; Greene, The Tort Reform Quagmire, FORBES, Aug. 11, 1986, at 76; King, A 
Catastrophic Year Has Airline Insurance Rocketing, Bus. WK., Jan. 20, 1986, at 30; La-
cayo, The Malpractice Blues, TIME, Feb. 24, 1986, at 60. 
2. See Dee, Bloodbath, ENTERPRISES, Mar./Apr. 1986, at 3; Businesses Struggling to 
Adapt as Insurance Crisis Spreads, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 33 [hereinafter Busi-
nesses Struggling]. 
3. See generally Child Care: The Emerging Insurance Crisis: Hearings Before the 
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985); Busi-
nesses Struggling, supra note 2, at 33. 
4. See Availability and Affordability Problems in Liability Insurance: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Business, Trade, and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearing] (statement of Rep. Porter) (DPT manufacturers stopping production); Drug 
Firm's Hands Tied; Users Suffer, Det. News, Oct. 15, 1986, at A4, col. 1. 
5. See Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, 72 A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 
48; DePalma, Liability Insurance: Hard to Get and Costly, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, 
§ 11, at 1, col. 5. 
6. · See, e.g., Act effective June 11, 1986, § 1, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 139 (codified 
at ALASKA STAT.·§ 09.17.010 (Supp. 1987)); Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 
86-160, § 59, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755 (codified at FLA. STAT.§ 768.80 (1987)); Act of May 
27, 1986, ch. 639, § 1, 1986 Md. Laws 2347, 2350 (codified as Mo. CTs. & Jun. Paoc. CooE 
ANN. § 11-108 (Supp. 1987)); Act of June 6, 1986, ch. 227, § 13, 1986 N.H. Laws 475, 485 
(codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1987)); Act of Apr. 4, 1986, ch. 305, 
§ 301, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1357 (codified at WASH. REV. CooE § 4.56.250 (Supp. 
1988)). 
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expressed opposition to the statutes, litigants will predictably 
seek legislative or judicial repeal of the limitations.7 
These limitations represent a second wave of legislation en-
acted in response to a crisis in affordable insurance coverage. 
Over the past ten years, a substantial number of states enacted 
limitations on medical malpractice awards when rising costs and 
limited insurance availability threatened insurance coverage for 
doctors and hospitals. 8 Studies indicate that these limitations 
helped slow the growth of malpractice insurance premiums 
where they were enacted.9 Legislators' efforts were frequently 
foiled, however, as states had their medical malpractice award 
limitations declared unconstitutional under the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment.10 
This Note sets forth a model statute that limits high damage 
awards, yet will withstand the rigors of judicial scrutiny. After 
presenting a brief background of the medical malpractice crisis 
in Part I, Part II outlines the standards of equal protection re-
view that the courts are presently using. The Note then focuses 
on the constitutional challenges to caps on medical malpractice 
liability in Part III. Part IV discusses the values and interests 
that were found to be dispositive in the courts' decisions. Fi-
nally, after analyzing the criteria that must be met to ensure 
that a legislative limitation will survive judicial scrutiny, Part V 
proposes a statute to circumscribe noneconomic damage awards. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The causes of the crisis and the legislative means employed to 
combat these evils must be delineated to understand properly 
the equal protection concerns raised by the damage caps. Fur-
thermore, an overview of these causes provides a foundation for 
ascertaining the rationales for legislative action and the resul-
tant judicial reactions. 
7. See Browning, Doctors and Lawyers Face Off, AB.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 38; 
Schwartz, Should There Be a Cap on Personal Injury Awards?, 64 MICH. B.J. 135 (1985). 
8. See Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical 
Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195 (1985). Professor Smith's review of the constitu-
tionality of malpractice limits focuses on the differences between state and federal equal 
protection standards of review. This Note takes the position that although there may be 
distinctions between the two positions, the state decisions and analyses are consistent 
with equal protection principles as presently employed by the Supreme Court. 
9. See P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
(Inst. For Civil Justice, Rand Corp. R-2870-ICJ, 1982). 
10. See infra notes 54-86 and accompanying text. 
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A. Factors Leading to the Crisis 
Although the impact of rising insurance rates is considerable, 
the involved parties are still vehemently debating the origins of 
the insurance problem.11 In general, several factors are cited as 
the main contributors to the crisis. First, the insurance compa-
nies blame aberrant behavior in the civil justice system, evi-
denced by unfair and capricious jury awards, for the crisis.12 Ac-
cusing the courts of running a get-rich-quick lottery for the 
masses, 13 insurance underwriters claim that the unpredictability 
of excessive liabilities has forced their companies either to raise 
premiums to protect themselves against potentially prohibitive 
damage awards, or to withdraw totally from insuring high risk 
activities. 14 
A second factor contributing to the current insurance crisis is 
the shrinking reinsurance market. Reinsurers provide insurance 
for primary coverage carriers by reimbursing the primary's 
payouts that exceed a specified amount. If insurance companies 
cannot obtain reinsurance for certain risks, they will not insure 
those risks. The reinsurance market is drying up for the same 
reasons that the primary insurance market is contracting: the 
unpredictability of the judicial system and the diminishing ca-
pacity to underwrite risks. 111 
11. See Franck, Tort Reform Update, 64 MICH. B.J. 1014 (1986); Perlam, Should 
Pain and Suffering Awards Haue Statutory Limits: Don't Punish the Injured, A.B.A. J., 
May 1, 1986, at 34; Rust, ABA Rejects AMA Tort Reform Plan, 3 MED. BENEFITS 22-27 
(1986). 
12. See Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of William C. Wyer, U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce); Wright, Why Tort Reform is Needed, BENCH & B. MINN., Mar. 
1986, at 20. 
13. Examples of seemingly outlandish jury awards abound. In one jury trial, a plain-
tiff was recompensed for the loss of a prize bull that died as a result of an accidental 
spraying of pesticides. The jury awarded the owner $1.5 million in compensatory dam-
ages and $7 million in punitive damages. 
When a 75-year old welder died of a heart attack while at a restaurant, his widow 
brought suit against his former employer, Getty Oil. Five months before the heart attack, 
the deceased had been severely burned while at work. Determining that the heart attack 
was caused by the stress of the burns, the court awarded the plaintiff $3.7 million in 
compensatory damages and $24,999,999 in punitive damages. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. lost a case where an obese man claimed his heart attack was 
caused by a lawn mower starter cord that was too difficult to pull. The jury awarded one 
million dollars in damages. Greene, The Hanging Judges of Business, FORBES, Apr. 7, 
1986, at 62; Taylor, Is It The Best Little Plaintiff's City in Texas?, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 8, 
1986, at 6, col. 1. 
14. See Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of William C. Wyer, U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce); Smith, supra note 8. 
15. See Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 93 (statement of Mindy Pollack, Assistant 
Gen. Counsel, Reinsurance Ass'n of Am.). 
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A third reason for high insurance costs results, ironically, from 
insurers charging too little in the past.16 Underwriters sold their 
policies at below-cost levels to build fiscal volume, hoping to 
cover casualty losses through earnings from high yield invest-
ments. As investment income declined and liability claims rose, 
the insurance companies were caught with insufficient funds to 
cover the mounting demands for indemnification. 17 Conse-
quently, the insurance companies either had to raise their pre-
miums to cover potential losses or completely reassess their in-
volvement in high risk markets. 18 
B. Two Legislative Responses 
State legislatures recently have attempted several solutions to 
the crisis, 19 frequently turning to limitations on compensatory 
awards.2° Florida and Washington illustrate two legislative ef-
forts to restrain tort liability awards that may create signifi-
cantly different results. 
In a comprehensive package, Florida lawmakers passed a 
straight $450,000 limitation upon the total noneconomic dam-
ages that any plaintiff can recover in a negligence or breach of 
16. See F. BELLOTrI, J. VAN DEKAMP, L. THORBURG, J. MATrOX, C. BROWN & B. LAFOL-
LETE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAF-
FORDABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 10-16 (1986); Molotsky, Drive to Limit Product Lia-
bility Grows as Consumer Groups Object, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1986, § 1, at 32, col. 1. 
17. See generally Senate Hearing, supra note 4; R. Fleming, Final Report to Gover-
nor James J. Blanchard on the Subject of Health Care Provider Malpractice and Mal-
practice Insurance (Dec. 17, 1985) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
18. 
The capacity constraints of the insurance industry also [contribute] to shortages 
of liability coverage. The industry generally follows a rule-of-thumb known as 
the 'Kennedy formula' which theorizes that premiums should not exceed surplus 
by more than 2 to 3 times. Because underwriting losses are partially paid from 
surplus, the ratio helps to ensure that carriers do not take on too much business 
in periods when surplus is low. In 1984, many insurance carriers experienced 
erosions of surplus due to heavy losses and lower investment earnings. As a re-
sult, in 1985, many carriers are turning away new business and more carefully 
selecting those businesses whom they wish to retain. 
Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 21 (statement of Frank S. Swan, Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, Small Business Admin.). 
19. Examples of state action are (1) restricting punitive damages, (2) eliminating the 
collateral source rule, (3) ending joint and several liability, (4) restricting the use of con-
tingent fees, and (5) modifying statutes of repose. Phillips, To Be or Not To Be: Reff.ec-
tions on Changing Our Tort System, 46 Mo. L. REV. 55, 56-62 (1986). 
20. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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warranty action.21 Noneconomic damages are defined in Florida 
as awards designed "to compensate for pain and suffering, in-
convenience, physical impairment, mental impairment, mental 
anguish, disfigurement, [and] loss of capacity for enjoyment of 
life. "22 
The main goal of the Florida law was to eliminate potentially 
aberrant and excessive jury awards in order to provide insurers 
with an objective basis for determining their premium rates. 23 
The legislature also wanted to ensure that victims were fully re-
imbursed for all compensable injuries. By establishing a top rate 
of $450,000, Florida legislators ensured that the vast majority of 
victims were not precluded from fully recovering for injuries. 24 
At the same time, the legislators declared a point at which spec-
ulation ceased and society's interests in promoting the continu-
ance of affordable insurance coverage took precedence. 
In the State of Washington, legislators took a different path 
by enacting a liability cap that limited a claimant's recovery for 
noneconomic damages to an amount "determined by multiplying 
0.43 by the average annual wage and by the life expectancy of 
the person incurring noneconomic damages. "25 The Washington 
legislature's stated goals were to provide' an objective standard 
by which insurance companies could predict potential risks with 
greater accuracy when establishing their premium rates, to pro-
vide full compensation for the economic costs incurred by the 
plaintiff, and to restrain jury reactions to the highly speculative 
costs of pain and suffering. 26 
A hypothetical example best demonstrates the differences be-
tween the Florida and Washington statutes. Falling debris from 
a construction site strikes and badly injures a sixty-year old wo-
man. As a result of the injury, the woman is deeply depressed, 
21. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, § 59, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755 
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (1987)). 
22. Id. § 60, 1986 Fla. Laws at 755 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (1987)). 
23. Id. § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws at 699. 
24. The legislatures have fixed the monetary figure for liability limitation at what is 
essentially an arbitrary number. S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 99 (1986). 
Known factors, however, can be used to provide a working framework for legislatures. 
The available figures for personal injury awards show that in New York the average set-
tlement is $31,740. Id. at 6. In a five-year study in Greenville County, South Carolina, 
83.6% of all personal injury awards were below $10,000, and only 1.7% exceeded 
$100,000. Id. at 110. Although generalizations from these figures are tenuous, it is fair to 
say that the legislative caps will allow equitable compensation for the vast majority of 
cases. 
25. Act of Apr. 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 301(2), 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1357 (codified at 
WASH. REV. CooE § 4.56.250 (Supp. 1988)). 
26. Id. 
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scarred, and in severe pain for two years. Under the Florida stat-
ute, drawing upon its past experiences to evaluate the severity of 
the women's pain and the depth of her depression, the trier of 
fact could determine that the woman had suffered noneconomic 
losses of $250,000 during that period. 
In Washington, a jury may reach the same results as the Flor-
ida jury, but its award will be cut in half under the statutory 
formula. Because the average life expectancy of the woman is 
only seventy-five years, taking 0.43 of the average wage, $8060 in 
this case, over her fifteen year life expectancy would limit her 
recovery to $120,900. The results of a number of such scenarios 
indicate that Washington's statute produces a more favorable 
climate for defendants than does Florida's. The consequence of 
such discrepancies among states is not only that victims in com-
parable circumstances will receive sharply divergent awards, but 
also that there may be an increase in forum shopping by plain-
tiffs who wish to avoid such restraints on their interests. 
C. Classifications Under the Caps on Liability 
By placing a ceiling on the damages that a tort victim can re-
cover, state legislatures implicitly established separate classifica-
tions between victims who are fully compensated for their inju-
ries and those who will not be fully compensated.27 Recoveries 
by victims who have suffered the gravest injuries, with poten-
tially lifelong aftereffects, may be limited by the damage cap, 
while those who have relatively slight injuries may receive com-
plete restitution for both the pecuniary and noneconomic dam-
ages they have suffered. Whether the ceiling limits recovery of 
all damages or of only noneconomic reparations, inevitably such 
classifications will deny some victims full compensation for their 
injuries. 
Faced with incomplete remedies and disparate treatment from 
the legislature, victims whose recoveries have been restricted are 
likely to challenge legislative caps in court both on tort liability 
and on equal protection grounds. These equal protection chal-
lenges pose the most potent obstacle to effective tort liability 
control. Yet, the evolving Supreme Court doctrine of equal pro-
tection, and analogously, the states' application of equal protec-
tion to legislative caps on medical malpractice liability, reveal 
the features of a constitutionally permissible tort liability cap. 
27. See infra notes 54-55 and accompai:iying text. 
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION 
Under the careful nurturance of the Supreme Court, the equal 
protection doctrine is formulated upon a relatively simple prem-
ise: the "pledge of the protection of equal laws."28 Concisely 
stated, the "Constitution does not require that things different 
in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. But it 
does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are simi-
larly situated be similarly treated."29 Once known as the "last 
resort" of constitutional arguments,30 the equal protection doc-
trine has matured with time into one of the most vibrant doc-
trines of modern American jurisprudence.31 Previously formu-
lated by the Court as a two-tiered test,32 the protections offered 
by the fourteenth amendment have evolved into a multi-faceted 
and potent tool of litigants. The broad interpretive powers avail-
able under the sliding scale of rationality have enabled many 
courts to strike down damage limitations under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
A. Strict Scrutiny 
The most stringent standard of equal protection review is the 
strict scrutiny test. Frequently described as "strict in theory and 
fatal in fact,"33 the highest standard of review requires that the 
legislative classification chosen be the least restrictive means 
28. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 
344 (1949); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.). 
29. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 28, at 344. 
30. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
31. See, e.g., Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 986 (D. Kan. 1985) (invalidating 
Kansas medical malpractice statute). 
32. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 8 (1972). The two-tiered standard featured at one level the strict scrutiny test for 
fundamental rights and suspect groups, and at the other level the rational relation test 
for the remaining legislative acts in the social and economic field. The test was referred 
to as outcome-determinative because the use of the strict scrutiny test invariably led to 
invalidation of the challenged legislation, and the use of the deferential rational relation 
test was sure to find the legislative action valid. Thus, whichever test the court initially 
decided to apply to a given situation would be the determining factor in the review. See 
also Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 
981, 1030 (1979). 
33. Gunther, supra note 32, at 8; see also Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n.6 
(1984) ("[o]nly rarely are statutes sustained in the face of strict scrutiny"). 
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possible in the promotion of a compelling state interest. 3• The 
exacting demands of strict scrutiny are reserved for two situa-
tions: first, when a legislative classification impinges upon a fun-
damental right;36 and second, when distinctions are based upon 
a "suspect" trait36 such as race,37 national origin,38 or alienage.39 
Although the Court declares that legislation may survive strict 
scrutiny,40 it appears that such a statement is simply a ritualistic 
cleansing of the soul, because the Court invariably finds that the 
impinging classifications fall short of the requisite degree of 
merit.41 
B. Intermediate Standard of Review 
Dissatisfaction with the outcome-determinative results of the 
traditional two-tiered test•2 led the Supreme Court to define a 
middle standard, the "intermediate" test.43 Under this standard, 
the court offers limited protection to groups that do not qualify 
as a suspect class, yet are still deemed to be worthy of protection 
34. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1000-02 (1978). 
35. Fundamental rights are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973); see, e.g., Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969) (travel); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (association). Discovery of new 
fundamental rights appears to be on the wane with the recent Supreme Court announce-
ment that it was not "inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover 
new fundamental rights," and therefore, "[t)here should be ... great resistance to ex-
pand the substantive reach of [the equal protection] clause." Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. 
Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986) (holding that sexual preference is not a fundamental right). 
36. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
37. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
38. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
39. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. 
YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 630-44 (2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter J. NOWAK). 
40. See L. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 16-6, at 1000. 
41. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). There have 
been only a handful of cases that have survived strict scrutiny. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding federal ceiling on individual contributions to political cam-
paigns); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 687 (1973) (50 day durational voter residency 
requirement "necessary" to promote the state's important interest in accurate voter 
lists"); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973) (same); Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding order excluding American citizens of Japanese origin 
from designated West Coast military areas). 
42. See Gunther, supra note 32, at 12. 
43. See Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1055 (1979); Note, Refining the Methods of Middle-Tier Scr~tiny: 
A New Proposal for Equal Protection, 61 Tux. L. REV. 1501 (1983). 
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from the prejudicial excesses of society.44 To withstand constitu-
tional challenge, classifications involving "quasi-suspect" traits 
"must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."411 The 
Court has rigidly limited its application of middle-tier scrutiny 
to statutes that classify according to ad hominem traits such as 
illegitimacy, alienage, or gender.46 
C. A Sliding Scale of Rational Relation Scrutiny 
In areas of social and economic regulation that do not involve 
fundamental rights and suspect or quasi-suspect groups, the 
Court has been uncertain about the extent of review it should 
exercise under the fourteenth amendment. 47 The standard for 
lowest-level review is generally refered to as "minimal rational-
ity," under which a court will refuse to set aside social legislation 
unless the complainant can show that the classification "is with-
out any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary."48 Im-
44. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (refusing to rec-
ognize the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect group). 
45. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma 
statute that prohibits sale of nonintoxicating beer to males under age 21 and to females 
under age 18) with Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking 
down a state policy excluding men from the university); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 
(1981) (upholding Selective Service Act requirement that only men register); Michael M. 
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (rejecting claim that California "statutory rape" 
law fails equal protection if it only punishes male participants). 
46. See Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 440-41. These classifications reflect "out-
moded notions" of citizens with a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or citizens 
who have been "subjected to unique disabilities ... not truly indicative of their abili-
ties." Id. at 441 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgin, 427 U.S. 307, 313 
(1976)). Because potential tort victims have not yet been identified, they cannot re-
present themselves to the public and legislature, and therefore, some argue, they are a 
suppressed group deserving quasi-suspect protection. See Note, California's Medical In-
jury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 
863 (1979). As Cleburne indicated, however, third parties can adequately protect power-
less groups. In the case of potential tort victims, however, state legislatures and Congress 
are composed largely of lawyers, who constitute one of the groups economically affected 
by the liability limitations; thus, the interests of tort victims should be more than ade-
quately voiced in the governing process. See also SB.I\dalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 446, 464-65 (1981) (examining the inherent problems of determining 
which groups deserve "quasi-suspect" status, and which groups the political process ade-
quately protects). 
47. J. NowAK, supra note 39, at 591-98. 
48. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) (upholding a 
state law regulating the uses of subterranean mineral water); see also McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (upholding a state law that permitted only certain 
merchants to sell merchandise, while forbidding vendors from selling the same goods); 
Gunther, supra iiote 32, at 12. 
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patient with the outcome-determinative results of the minimal-
ist test,0 however, the Court has concluded that not all cases 
involving social legislation can fit within the confines of the 
traditional rational relation test and still meet the standard of 
fundamental fairness demanded by the equal protection clause.60 
As a result, the "heightened rationality" standard has emerged. 
Under this test, courts no longer hypothesize any conceivable 
legislative purpose, but demand that a "substantial relationship" 
exist between the ends and means of the challenged statute.111 
The Supreme Court's application of the rationality tests indi-
cates its adoption of a sliding scale of review that wavers be-
tween the minimal and heightened tests. Case law indicates that 
depending upon the egregiousness of the factual circumstances 
before it, the Court will employ a standard that "comprehends 
variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scruti-
nize particular classifications, depending . . . on the constitu-
tional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected 
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the 
particular classification is drawn."52 Courts can employ, there-
49. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
50. See Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 990 (D. Kan. 1985) (concluding from 
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 
U.S. 869 (1985) that the Supreme Court has adopted a new-but undeclared-test that 
is distinct from the traditional rational basis test); L. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 16-5, at 
999-1000. 
51. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 416 (1920) (striking 
down a state statute exempting local businesses that only do business outside of the 
state from income taxes). The heightened rationality test envisions the court playing a 
more active role in the formulation of social regulation. As Professor Gunther stated: 
Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the 
Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imag-
ination. It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative pur-
poses that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. 
Gunther, supra note 32, at 21. 
The courts will use their "teeth" in the heightened rational relation to exceed "the 
conceivable basis standard by scrutinizing the state's asserted interest, the means se-
lected to advance those interests, and the factual connection between the state's classifi-
cation and the end." Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Pro-
tection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 
1071, 1101 (1974). Therefore, by examining the conflicting interests and the means em-
ployed, the court utilizes a balancing test in order to protect those interests that are not 
fundamental or suspect, but are still of enough importance to be found worthy of the 
court's protection in certain circumstances. Linde, Due Process of Law Making, 55 NEB. 
L. REV. 197, 208-09 (1976). 
52. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 520 (1975) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) ("While we have in the past exercised our imaginations to conceive of possible 
rational justifications for statutory classifications, we have recently declined to manufac-
ture justifications in order to save an apparently invalid statutory classification." (cita-
tions omitted)); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring) ("It is 
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fore, either heightened rationality to ensure legislative precision 
and responsibility, or minimal rationality to verify legislative en-
actments promulgated diligently and with accountability.~3 
Ill. COURT DECISIONS DECIDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RECOVERY LIMITATIONS 
Because legislatures have only recently adopted ceilings on 
tort recovery, plaintiffs have not yet challenged the validity of 
the statutes. State court perceptions of the equal protection doc-
trine involved in challenges to medical malpractice limitations 
provide a guide to the present analysis of tort liability caps. 
A majority of the courts considering the validity of the caps 
on malpractice liability have found that the ceilings violate 
equal protection principles.MA comparison of the decisions find-
ing the limits unconstitutional with decisions finding the ceilings 
clear that we employ not just one, or two, but ... a 'spectrum of standards.' "). Proof of 
a heightened rationality test is built upon a growing base of precedent, while the Su-
preme Court continues to "lead[] court and counsel into a labyrinth of fictions" by refus-
ing to acknowledge its existence. Linde, supra note 51, at 208; see, e.g., Cleburne, 473 
U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance limiting homes for the mentally re-
tarded); Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (striking down a state tax that imposed a higher rate upon 
out of state companies); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding 
invalid a statute that denied claimant a hearing); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 
(1974) (invalidating provision of Social Security Act); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973) (disqualifying a provision of the federal food stamp program for assistance limited 
to households composed of related persons); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (in-
validating statute that required recoupment of legal expenses incurred in the defense of 
indigent); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down criminal sanctions for 
the sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons). 
53. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99, 127 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (objecting to lower 
court's finding that education is not a fundamental right). For authors who have dis-
cerned the use of a sliding scale of rationality, see Bice, Standards of Judicial Review, 50 
S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 700-01 (1977); Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality 
as a Surrogate for Other Rights, 59 TUL. L. REV. 884 (1985); Linde, supra note 51, at 208; 
Nowak, supra note 51, at 1101; O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The 
Case of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19, 52 (1979); Wilkinson, The Supreme 
Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 
61 VA. L. REV. 945, 954 (1975). 
54. Several state courts have struck down caps on medical malpractice suits. See 
Florida Medical Center v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 
2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (reversing lower court due to passage of remedial amendment during 
appeal); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 
431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 
736 (1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio App. 3d 164, 355 
N.E.2d 903 (1976); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 
672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). 
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valid1111 reveals a set of common factors that were weighed in the 
judicial balance. Analysis of these common factors discloses the 
criteria that a legislature should meet when it drafts caps on tort 
liability. 
A. Jurisdictions Holding Medical Malpractice Statutes 
Unconstitutional on Equal Protection Grounds 
The first challenge of a malpractice damage limitation statute 
before a state high court was Wright v. Central Du Page Hospi-
tal Association. 116 In Wright, the plaintiff sought a declaratory 
judgment against the constitutionality of the Illinois medical 
malpractice statute.117 The plaintiff sought judgment against a 
section of the Act which provided that the maximum recovery 
"on account of injuries" by reason of medical, hospital or other 
healing art malpractice" was $500,000. The statute thus pro-
vided malpractice security for doctors and insurers by placing a 
ceiling on the total economic and noneconomic damages recover-
able by a victim. 
The plaintiff asserted that the liability cap violated the equal 
protection and due process guarantees of the Illinois and federal 
constitutions.118 Conversely, the defendant argued that the ac-
tions were within the province of proper legislative conduct, and 
that the classifications were a necessary step in dealing with the 
medical malpractice insurance crisis.119 
55. California, Indiana, and Nebraska courts have upheld caps on medical malprac-
tice suits. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368,695 
P.2d 665 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 
273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 
1985); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977). 
56. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). 
57. Section 401a of the Illinois Insurance Code, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, para. 1023a 
(1975). This statute was subsequently repealed by Act approved Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-
288, § 2, 1979 Ill. Laws 1442. 
58. Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 325-26, 347 N.E.2d at 741. The plaintiff argued that the 
legislative limitation was an arbitrary and unreasonably discriminatory classification be-
cause the state's efforts to minimize the growth of medical malpractice insurance premi-
ums placed a harsh burden on severely injured victims who were most in need of finan-
cial protection, yet fully compensated malpractice victims who sustained relatively slight 
injuries. 
59. Id. The one step at a time formula was enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("(T)he reform may take one step at 
a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the 
legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy 
there, neglecting the others."). See also Note, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 
(1969). 
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The standard of equal protection review used by the Wright 
court in declaring the statute unconstitutional is not clearly dis-
cernable from the record. Although the court purportedly found 
no rational basis for the legislative classification,60 the court's ac-
tions indicate that it employed a standard of scrutiny more ex-
acting than mere deferential rationality.61 The court weighed the 
concerns of the legislature against the injustice of depriving a 
victim of full economic compensation mandated under the com-
mon law without a quid pro quo.62 
As a result of this weighing, the court found the statutory 
damage limitations unconstitutional.63 Specifically, the court in-
dicated its distaste for substantive limitations on economic dam-
ages: "[T]he very seriously injured malpractice victim, because 
of the recovery limitation, might be unable to recover even all 
the medical expenses he might incur."64 The legislature's statute 
created arbitrary distinctions and was not rational.611 The court 
declared, furthermore, that although the plaintiff did not have a 
vested right in a common law cause of action,66 her claim could 
not be arbitrarily limited without a resultant quid pro quo.67 
The court rejected the defendant's assertion of a "societal" quid 
pro quo, that "the loss of recovery potential to some malpractice 
victims is offset by 'lower insurance premiums and lower medical 
care costs for all recipients of medical care.' "68 It stated that 
these benefits did not extend to the seriously injured medical 
malpractice victim.69 By interweaving the equal protection anal-
ysis with the loss of a common law remedy, the court found the 
60. Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 330, 347 N.E.2d at 743. 
61. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The deferential rationality standard 
should always lead to a finding of constitutionality. 
62. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: 
Constitutional Implications, 55 Tux. L. REV. 759, 789 (1977). The quid pro quo argu-
ment is based upon the fourteenth amendment in that by eliminating a remedy, without 
providing a concomitant remedy, the legislature is acting in an irrational manner. 
63. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 329-30, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 
(1976). Justice Underwood, in dissent, conceded that a stronger case for upholding the 
statute would have been made if the $500,000 limitation had permitted full compensa-
tion for economic damages, and only limited noneconomic damages. Id. at 334, 347 
N.E.2d at 746. 
64. Id. at 327-28, 347 N.E.2d at 742. 
65. Id. at 329, 347 N.E.2d at 743. 
66. Id. at 327, 347 N.E.2d at 743. 
67. Id. at 329, 347 N.E.2d at 743 ("[T]o the extent that recovery is permitted or 
denied on an arbitrary basis a special privilege is granted in violation of the Illinois 
Constitution."). 
68. Id. at 328, 347 N.E.2d at 742. 
69. Id.; see also Note, supra note 46, at 871 n.256 (1979) ("As a matter of logic, the 
benefits of the legislation (reduced or maintained medical costs) would, of course, inure 
to even the most severely injured patient. However, as evident in the Wright court's 
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balance weighed in favor of the plaintiff.70 The $500,000 limita-
tion, consequently, denied recovery on an arbitrary basis and 
constituted special legislation; on this basis, the court declared 
the statute to be unconstitutional. 71 
Because Illinois' Wright decision was the first state high court 
pronouncement on the validity of malpractice liability caps, 
commentators and courts widely analyzed and applied it.72 Al-
though the court's reasoning has been criticized,73 many approve 
of its results,74 and its persuasive effect influenced later court 
decisions. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Jones v. State Board of 
Medicine75 was the first court to openly use the heightened ra-
tionality standard. In deciding whether a provision of the Idaho 
Hospital-Medical Liability Act76 violated state and federal equal 
protection standards,77 the court announced its support for the 
heightened rationality standard and specifically refuted the no-
tion of judicial restraint.78 
discussion of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the court focused on whether the stat-
ute's benefits were outweighed by the burdens it imposed."). 
70. See Redish, supra note 62, at 789. 
71. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 330, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 
(1976). The constitutional protections afforded by the special law prohibition of the Illi-
nois Constitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment are vir-
tually identical. See, e.g., Chicago Nat'! League Ball Club v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 
368, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1255 (1985); McRoberts v. Adams, 60 Ill. 2d 458, 463, 328 N.E.2d 
321, 324 (1975). 
72. See, e.g., Note, Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association: A Grim Progno-
sis For Medical Malpractice Review Panels?, 22 S.D.L. REV. 461, 465-66 (1977); Illinois 
Supre'l}e Court Review-Constitutional Law-Medical Malpractice Statute Unconstitu-
tional, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 298 [hereinafter Illinois Supreme Court Review]; Note, Medical 
Malpractice Statute-Medical Malpractice Statute Declared Unconstitutional, 1977 
Wis. L. REV. 203 [hereinafter Note, Statute Declared Unconstitutional]. 
73. See Redish, supra note 62; Illinois Supreme Court Review, supra note 72, at 316-
20; Note, Statute Declared Unconstitutional, supra note 72, at 221, 225-26. 
74. See Illinois Supreme Court Review, supra note 72, at 320; Comment, Testing the 
Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Legislation: The Wisconsin Medical Malprac-
tice Act of 1975, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 838, 869. 
75. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). 
76. Id. at 862, 555 P.2d at 402. IDAHO CoDE § 39-4204 (1977) limited liability to 
$150,000 per malpractice claim and $300,000 per malpractice occurrence. 
77. Jones, 97 Idaho at 870, 555 P.2d at 410. 
78. Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 411 ("[B]lind adherence and over-indulgence results in 
abdication of judicial responsibility."). Deferential equal protection was enunciated in 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961): 
The constitutional safeguard [of equal protection] is offended only if the classifi-
cation rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec-
tive. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional 
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A 
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may 
be conceived to justify it. 
Id. at 425-26. 
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Noting the injustice of preventing full recovery to those most 
seriously injured while conferring a benefit upon the doctors and 
hospitals of the state,79 the court adopted a means-oriented fo-
cus.80 The tribunal declared that when the challenged statutory 
classification discriminates on its face, and no relationship exists 
between the classification and the declared legislative purpose, 
the court must bypass the minimum scrutiny test and apply a 
heightened standard of review.81 Consequently, the court or-
dered that the lower court factually determine whether the 
"statute reflects any reasonably conceived public purpose, and 
[whether] the establishment of the classification [has] a fair and 
substantial relation to the achievement of the objective and 
purpose. "82 
Subsequent court decisions holding malpractice recovery limi-
tations unconstitutional combine the analyses of Jones and 
Wright. 83 The state courts that have found the limitations un-
constitutional have used a standard of review more exacting 
than deferential rationality without explicitly announcing their 
standard. s• Although these courts have concentrated on the fac-
tual nexus between legislative purpose and statutory means, an 
implicit evaluation of the conflicting interests played a promi-
nent role in the decisionmaking process.811 The courts have bal-
anced the governmental goals of assuring adequate health care 
and lowering malpractice insurance costs against the interests of 
79. "The classification which is thereby created distinguishes between those who are 
damaged as a result of medical malpractice in amounts exceeding $150,000 as contrasted 
with others likewise damaged by medical malpractice but whose damages are less than 
$150,000." Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 870, 555 P.2d 399, 410, cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). 
80. Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 411 ("That test scrutinizes the means by which the chal-
lenged legislation is said to affect its articulated and otherwise legitimate purpose."). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. The court relied on the standard set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). 
83. See Florida Medical Center v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983) (finding legislation violative of equal protection), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985); Carson 
v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (striking down the statute as a violation of 
equal protection and failure to provide a quid pro quo); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 
125 (N.D. 1978) (holding the imposition of limitations unjustified by lack of evidence 
supporting the existence of a crisis); Boucher v. Sayed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (finding 
of no crisis did not support classification burden under equal protection); Baptist Hosp. 
v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (utilizing the equal protection and quid 
pro quo analysis to strike down the damage cap). 
84. See, e.g., supra note 32 and accompanying text (traditional rationality defers to 
legislative decisions); Redish, supra note 62, at 766; Smith, supra note 8, at 207 (1985). 
85. See Smith, supra note 8, at 207; Note, supra note 46, at 880. 
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the victims of medical malpractice. In each instance, the consti-
tutional balance favored the victims who were denied economic 
restitution; as a result, each statute was declared arbitrary and 
not based upon a rational decision-making basis.86 
B. Jurisdictions Holding Liability Limitations Constitutional 
Courts that have upheld malpractice liability limitations 
against equal protection attacks have done so under the minimal 
rational relation standard of review.87 The first court to approve 
malpractice damage restrictions was the Nebraska Supreme 
Court in Prendergast v. Nelson. 88 The plaintiff sought a declara-
tory judgment against the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability 
Act, which places a $500,000 ceiling on damages.89 
The Nebraska court, using the minimal standard of review re-
sorted to by other courts when examining social and economic 
legislation, rejected the judicial activism of Wright. 00 Noting 
that the legislature was "free to experiment and to innovate and 
to do so at will, or even 'at [its] whim,' "91 the court held that 
the legislature's classifications properly ensured the preservation 
of insurance coverage. Consequently, the court specifically sanc-
tioned the state's right to address the malpractice insurance cri-
sis in this fashion. 
The Nebraska court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that 
the legislature does not have the right to change common law 
doctrines. The court declared that the legislature was not lim-
86. Florida Medical Center v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 
474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (reversing lower court due to passage of remedial amendment 
during appeal); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 
N.E.2d 736 (1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. 
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio App. 
3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); Baptist Hosp. 
v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). 
87. See Smith, supra note 8, at 209. 
88. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977). 
89. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2821(2) (Supp. 1987). Under the statute, a claimant is able 
to elect whether or not to be included within the statutory limitations prior to receiving 
medical treatment. The majority relied substantially upon this factor. Nelson, 199 Neb. 
at 101, 256 N.W.2d at 669. Justice White, in dissent, however, indicates that a patient 
who is brought unconscious to the hospital does not have the power to elect under the 
statute, and the power of the hospitals to deny medical treatment to those who do not 
elect is a powerful coercive tool. Id. at 132, 256 N.W.2d at 676. 
90. Nelson, 199 Neb. at 107, 256 N.W.2d at 676-77. 
91. Id. at 114, 256 N.W.2d at 668 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)). 
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ited by a judicial requirement that it ensure a quid pro quo 
when redefining common law rights. 92 
The California Supreme Court's ruling in Fein u. Permanente 
Medical Group is indicative of the general tenor of recent deci-
sions that have upheld legislative caps on liability.93 The court 
rejected the plaintiff's claim that the malpractice limitations on 
noneconomic damages violated the equal protection doctrine,94 
and refused to endorse the requirement of a quid pro quo rem-
edy or to adopt the heightened rationality standard of review for 
social legislation. The court applied the minimal rationality 
standard and justified the legislative classifications as an at-
tempt to lower liability costs and to limit medical malpractice 
insurance premiums.9 ~ Central to the California court's decision 
was the fact that the legislature had "placed no limits whatso-
ever on a plaintiff's right to recover for all of the economic, pe-
cuniary damages-such as medical expenses or lost earn-
ings-resulting from the injury."96 It distinguished contrary 
decisions because "[w]ith only one exception, all of the invali-
dated statutes contained a ceiling which applied to both pecuni-
ary and nonpecuniary damages, and several courts-in reaching 
their decisions-were apparently considerably influenced by the 
potential harshness of a limit that might prevent an injured per-
son from recovering his medical expenses. "97 
The court dismissed the plaintiff's argument in favor of a con-
stitutionally mandated quid pro quo, and reaffirmed the legisla-
ture's right "to modify the scope and nature of such damages."98 
In addition, the court noted that the legislative steps to preserve 
a viable medical malpractice insurance program had provided a 
safety net by ensuring that patients who were injured would be 
92. Id. at 106, 256 N.W.2d at 664-65 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)): 
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. 
That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred than any 
other. Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be 
taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be 
changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by 
constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy de-
fects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of 
time and circumstances. 
93. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 
U.S. 892 (1985). 
94. Id. at 157-58, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83, 695 P.2d at 679. 
95. Id. at 157-59, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83, 695 P.2d at 679-80. 
96. Id. at 159, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383, 695 P.2d at 680. 
97. Id. at 161, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 695 P.2d at 682. 
98. Id. (citing American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 204 
Cal. Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670 (1984) holding that the statute providing for periodic pay-
ments of "future damages" does not violate due process or equal protection principles). 
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able to receive some form of compensation. If the state had not 
taken that step to limit liability awards, many doctors might be 
forced to practice without insurance, thereby effectively denying 
a victim complete economic or noneconomic compensation.99 
IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE COURT DECISIONS 
Although the state courts are split on the constitutionality of 
medical malpractice liability ceilings, 100 a pattern emerges from 
the decisions that helps to explain the final outcome rendered by 
the respective courts. The standard of equal protection review, 
the existence of a concomitant remedy, and the legal difference 
between economic and noneconomic damages are the prominent 
factors weighed by the courts. 
A. Standard of Review 
All of the courts that have examined the validity of the mal-
practice liability limitations under equal protection have used 
some form of the rational relation test.101 The results indicate 
that tribunals evaluate the competing interests of groups af-
fected by the legislation.102 Courts have attempted to strike a 
99. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 160, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 384, 
695 P.2d 665, 681 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985). 
100. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
101. See Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Con-
stitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 143 (1981) (citing cases); see, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 
(1980). Although the Carson court purported to use the intermediate standard, it ap-
pears that the court employed the heightened rational relation test. The court's named 
standard is probably the result of widespread confusion over the difference between the 
intermediate test, which applies to quasi-suspect groups, and the heightened rational 
relation test. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 605 n.5 (11th Ed. 1985) ("the 'newer 
equal protection' theory is not the same as the 'intermediate' scrutiny developed in the 
modern cases for some quasi-suspect classifications such as gender."). 
102. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); see also Linde, supra note 51, at 208: 
[It is] stressed that the reviewing court should concentrate on the rationality of 
the means without disturbing the legislative choice of ends. Still, although it 
purports to leave policy choices to the political process, the test depends on 
holding the law to some objective other than the immediate effect of the law 
itself. Thus it forces litigants to debate the ostensible or assumed goal of a policy 
as much as the likelihood that the goal will be reached by means of the chal-
lenged law. And the effort to phrase this debate as a scrutiny of reasons rather 
than of values-of rationality rather than legitimacy-leads court and counsel 
into a labyrinth of fictions. 
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balance between the state goals of providing adequate health 
care and lowering malpractice insurance costs and ensuring the 
interests of the malpractice victim. 103 Depending upon how a 
majority of a court views the succeeding balance, the court has 
employed either heightened rationality to strike down the legis-
lation, 104 or minimal rationality to sustain the liability 
limitations. 1011 
B. Recovery Limitations 
The determining factor in each validity of malpractice liability 
limitations decision has been whether the cap limits economic or 
noneconomic damages. Without expressly stating why economic 
damages are considered to be fundamentally more important 
than noneconomic damages, courts have given the respective 
damage types different weights. 
1. Judicial recognition of economic damages as a quasi-fun-
damental right- Courts that have declared that statutory caps 
violative of the equal protection clause have emphasized the 
presence of a limitation on economic damages. 106 These courts 
clearly exhibit the hostility of the judiciary to a statute that 
could prevent an innocent victim from recovering even the pecu-
niary losses suffered as a result of another party's negligent ac-
tions.107 Although the goal is to place victims back in their origi-
nal positions, denial of economic losses has the inequitable 
result of preventing the victim from recovering even the most 
basic building block in the remedial process. Consequently, the 
courts have found that the legislative goal of limiting economic 
damages does not justify the seemingly arbitrary results.108 
Compensatory recovery for economic injuries incurred through 
the fault of another is not considered a fundamental right.109 
103. See Note, supra note 46, at 880 for a detailed discussion of the various decisions. 
104. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
105. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
106. See supra note 86. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) is aber-
rant as the only decision striking down a statute that limited solely noneconomic 
damages. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 68 and 83. · 
108. See supra note 86. 
109. See Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981); Estate of Cargill v. City of 
Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704 (1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980); 
Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Jones v. State Bd. 
of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976); State 
ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). 
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Yet, it is nonetheless viewed as "an important substantive 
right. "ll0 When a salient value exists within a substantial nexus 
to interests implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, a majority of the Supreme Court has been willing to desig-
nate these values as quasi-fundamental rights.m To provide ad-
equate protection for these preferred values, the Court employs 
a standard beyond the traditional confines of the rationality 
test, which is attested to by the rise of the heightened rationality 
test within the context of equal protection. 112 
Under the auspices of equal protection the individual is secure 
from deprivation of those liberties "long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by men. "ll3 
As the Supreme Court stated in Ingraham v. Wright: 
Among the historic liberties so protected was a right to 
be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified 
intrusions on personal security. 
While the contours of this historic liberty interest in 
the context of our federal system of government have not 
been defined precisely, they always have been thought to 
encompass freedom from bodily restraint and 
punishment. n• 
110. Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 994 (D. Kan. 1985); Learner, supra note 
101; see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
111. L. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 15-9, at 919-20, § 16-31, at 1089-92; Linde, supra 
note 51, at 208. For general examples of the use of heightened rationality, see City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance 
that limited homes for the mentally retarded); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 
U.S. 869 (1985) (striking down a state tax that imposed a higher rate upon out of state 
companies); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding invalid a stat-
ute that denied claimant a hearing); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 
(1974) (invalidating local school board requirement that pregnant teachers take unpaid 
maternity leaves of several months); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (invali-
dating provision of Social Security Act); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that education is a fundamental 
right); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down a provision of the federal 
food stamp program limiting assistance to households composed of related persons); 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (striking down irrebuttable presumption of 
out-of-state residence for those whose legal address is outside the state) (White, J., con-
curring); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating criminal sanctions for the 
sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (in-
validating statute that enabled state to recoup expenses incurred in legal defense of 
indigents). 
112. This trend is undeniable, as exhibited in the Supreme Court decisions cited 
supra note 111 and in the state court decisions discussed in the text accompanying supra 
notes 83-86 that have emulated the trend. See L. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 16-32, at 1082; 
Gunther, supra note 32, at 12; Linde, supra note 51, at 208. 
113. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
114. 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977). 
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A fundamental precept of societal law, stretching back to the 
earliest forms of societal justice, is the right to be free from un-
warranted bodily invasion. 1111 When viewed in conjunction with 
judicial protection of rights central to personal privacy, "the 
rights to personal security and bodily integrity, and correspond-
ing rights to relief from invasions thereof, are logically encom-
passed by this constitutional interpolation."116 Consequently, 
the courts view preservation of full compensatory damages as an 
interest unable to attain the stringent protections provided a 
fundamental right, yet it is still deserving of more protection 
than is traditionally accorded to values examined under the 
minimal rational relation test. Because economic damages form 
the cornerstone of the attempt to return victims to the position 
they held prior to their accidents, the judiciary considers the 
preservation of economic damages to carry the weight of a quasi-
fundamental right. Thus, the courts will examine closely legisla-
tive means and goals to ensure that majoritarian liability limita-
tions do not unduly impinge upon the valued rights of an inade-
quately represented minority. 117 
2. Judicial scrutiny of noneconomic damages under the 
minimal rationality test- Courts have held that legislation lim-
iting only noneconomic damages does not affront the constitu-
tional principles of equal protection.118 Because awards for pain 
and suffering and other nonpecuniary damages are not funda-
mental rights under the Constitution, 119 and are not considered 
to be as integral to physical recovery as economic damages, the 
courts have recognized that "the Legislature possesses broad au-
115. 
And if men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with his fist, 
and he die not, but keepeth his bed; 
If he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him 
be quit: only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be 
thoroughly healed. 
Exodus, 21:18-19; see also Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (pts. 1 & 2), 
33 YALE L.J. 799 (1924), 34 YALE L.J. 343 (1925); Deiser, The Development of Principle 
in Trespass, 27 YALE L.J. 220 (1917). 
116. Learner, supra note 101, at 191; see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
117. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (advocating the use of 
"representation-reinforcing" model in constitutional adjudication for the protection of 
minority interests within a majoritarian government). 
118. See Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983 (D. Kan. 1985); Fein v. Permanente 
Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665 (en bane), appeal dis-
missed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); see also Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 
313, 332, 347 N.E.2d 736, 745 (1976) (Underwood, J., dissenting). 
119. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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thority to modify the scope and nature of such damages."120 The 
wisdom of noneconomic damage awards, as for pain and suffer-
ing, has frequently faced critical review by jurists and legal 
scholars. 121 The noneconomic damage award has become a well-
established remedy, but courts have not accorded it the same 
deference as pecuniary damages. Although economic costs are 
viewed as integral to physical recovery, noneconomic damages 
are not essential to recovery or are so speculative that their rela-
tive value is diminished. Critics of nonpecuniary damages note 
that "the law relating to damages for pain and suffering in per-
sonal injury cases is extremely uncertain and the outcome of its 
application by juries and courts is highly unpredictable."122 In 
the absence of definitive principles to guide courts and juries, 
detractors believe that "money damages are at best only imper-
fect compensation for such intangible injuries and . . . such 
damages are generally pass·ed on to, and borne by, innocent 
consumers. "123 
Because noneconomic damages are highly speculative, the 
courts will not accord limitations on noneconomic damages the 
same weight or value accorded to limitations on the more de-
fined and objective economic damages.12• State courts base their 
actions upon the sliding scale of rationality and are more willing 
to find a rational basis for the noneconomic limitations, as op-
posed to the economic restraints, by deferring to legislative ini-
tiatives to curb the lesser-valued pain and suffering costs in or-
der to solve a perceived crisis "one step at a time."1211 
120. Permanente, 38 Cal. 3d at 157, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382, 695 P.2d at 680 (citing 
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 683 
P.2d 670 (1984)). 
121. See generally Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 
LAW & CoNTEMP. Paoas. 219 (1958); Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 476 (1959); Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 200 (1958); 
Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27 (1954). Originally 
courts employed "pain and suffering" in legal actions as a form of punitive damages to 
prevent retaliation by the victim's family. O'Connell & Bailey, The History of Payment 
For Pain & Suffering, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 83. Courts have recognized pain and suffering 
since the mid-1800's as a common damage remedy in negligence suits. Id. at 94; see also 
Seifert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169, 364 P.2d 
337, 345 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting). 
122. Plant, supra note 121, at 210. 
123. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 159, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 384, 
695 P.2d 665, 680-81 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985). 
124. Id.; see also Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 992-93 (D. Kan. 1985). 
125. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 
665 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Johnson~- St. Vincent Hosp., 273 
Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 
(1977). 
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C. Quid Pro Quo 
The second consideration in the judicial balancing act has 
been whether a quid pro quo is constitutionally mandated in or-
der to protect malpractice victims from the arbitrary limitations 
of the legislature.126 Although the courts have denied that an al-
ternative remedy is a prerequisite to proper legislative abroga-
tion of common law actions, 127 they have relied on the "presence 
or absence of a quid pro quo to the disadvantaged class as a 
factor in their determination."126 Thus, when legislatures couple 
the loss of a malpractice remedy with the potentially harsh re-
sults of a limitation on economic damages, courts find the scales 
tip in favor of the victimized plaintiff. 
In contrast, a number of courts have either rejected the neces-
sity of a quid pro quo or found that the legislative actions pre-
serve a remedy for malpractice victims. The California court in 
Fein u. Permanente Medical Group129 found a legislative intent 
to provide a quid pro quo by ensuring that doctors were able to 
afford malpractice insurance. The court found that victims 
might be unable to recover funds sufficient to cover their medi-
cal expenses from negligent doctors who lacked insurance. 130 
The Wright court's contrary holding was flawed, in that the 
court refused to recognize that the societal benefit of reduced 
medical costs may enure to a victim who has previously paid 
lower insurance premiums, and she may receive medical treat-
ment for her injuries at a reduced cost.131 
126. See supra notes 58-89 and accompanying text. 
127. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Wright 
v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 328-31, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742-743 (1976); 
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 942-43, 424 A.2d 825, 837-38 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 
270 N.W.2d 125, 134-35 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio 
Misc. 2d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903, 909-10 (C.P. Montgomery County 1976); see also Redish, 
supra note 62, at 785; Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting 
Liability for Medical Malpractice, 10 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 419, 463 (1976). 
128. Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). 
129. 38 Cal. 3d at 160 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.18, 695 P.2d at 682 n.18 (en bane), 
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985). 
130. Id. at 158, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383, 695 P.2d at 680. The logic of the court is readily 
apparent. With the average medical malpractice jury award being $950,000, see Senate 
Hearing, supra note 4, at 33 (statement of William Wyer, U.S. Chamber of Commerce), 
very few doctors will be able to pay the enormous damages that are awarded to malprac-
tice victims. The rationale behind the existence of insurance is to prevent the burden 
from falling solely upon one person. Instead, it is economically efficient to spread the 
cost across the boundaries of society. Therefore, if affordable insurance coverage is not 
preserved, the end result will be that in many cases the negligent party will not be able 
to pay the costs meant to reimburse the plaintiff, or will be financially destroyed. 
131. See Note, supra note 46, at 871 n.256. 
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Consequently, the judicial decisions reflect a burgeoning un-
certainty over whether an alternative remedy is a prerequisite to 
legislative restriction of common law remedies. Those courts 
that did not reject the issue out of hand have still hesitated to 
rely solely on the absence of a quid pro quo to justify their ac-
tion against legislative restriction. 132 Apparently, the courts' in-
decision reflects their concern that adoption of the quid pro quo 
doctrine could significantly hamper the legislative power to ef-
fect social change. A judicial requirement that the legislature 
formulate a "reasonable substitute" every time that it abrogates 
or modifies obsolete common law rights would effectively restrict 
legislative initiatives in the legal field. "Moreover, by immuniz-
ing common-law rights from total abrogation, the doctrine effec-
tively raises common-law causes of action to the level of consti-
tutional rights, a status they were never intended to have."133 A 
basic element of common law development is its amoebic ability 
to penetrate or recede according to the evolving values of soci-
ety. Limiting the evolution of the common law by a judicially 
mandated quid pro quo would stymie both the state's ability to 
act as a social laboratory, and the creative potential of the com-
mon law.134 
The presence or absence of a quid pro quo may therefore 
carry some weight in the final judicial decision. Yet, in the face 
of judicial illegitimacy and the countervailing system's interest, 
the courts have not found the absence of a quid pro quo to be in 
itself a determinative factor. 1311 A statute which solely limits 
noneconomic damages, therefore, will not be invalidated under 
the quid pro quo argument. 
D. Summary 
In order to establish a valid statute, a legislature must work 
within the confines of modern equal protection jurisprudence.136 
The judicial positions reveal a series of common factors that are 
determinative in the final outcome. The paramount factor in the 
equation is the judicial decision to adopt a sliding scale of ra-
tionality. Sensitive to the erratic path set forth by the Supreme 
132. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
133. Redish, supra note 62, at 787. 
134. See id. at 787. 
135. See Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); see also J. 
ELY, supra note 117. 
136. See generally Tussman and tenBroeck, supra note 28. 
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Court, state courts have emulated the varying levels of scrutiny 
employed by the Court in its equal protection analysis. The new 
attitude indicates that independent of the legislative will, in cer-
tain contexts, the judiciary will scrutinize and weigh the conflict-
ing interests at issue. This freedom provides the court with a 
tool to ensure that judicially prized values will be dealt with by 
the legislatures in the rational manner contemplated by the 
principles underlying the Constitution. 
Legislation limiting tort damages will inevitably discriminate 
between severely injured tort victims, who will not be fully com-
pensated, and those with relatively slight injuries, who will be 
fully recompensed. The judiciary has weighed the legislative 
goals and means utilized to assure affordable insurance coverage 
against the interests of the injured parties. Courts have refused 
to validate restraints that limit the victims's quasi-fundamental 
right to full recovery of economic damages, without the existence 
of a concomitant quid pro quo. In contrast, the subjective value 
of noneconomic damages has not weighed as heavily on the judi-
cial scales. In such cases, the courts are willing to defer to legis-
lative attempts to solve the liability crisis by limiting the 
amount of noneconomic damages that a victim may recover. 
Consequently, to remain viable under the strictures of the 
equal protection doctrine, a restraint on damages must only 
limit noneconomic damages. Any attempt to limit a victim's re-
covery of economic damages is simply an invitation for judicial 
intervention, and a declaration that the statute is an arbitrary 
act without rational basis. 
V. MODEL STATUTE TO LIMIT TORT LIABILITY 
This Note proposes a statute with a constitutionally valid lim-
itation upon noneconomic damages. It employs a straight limita-
tion in order to avoid possible confusion and collateral consider-
ations. Because the ceiling figure is basically arbitrary, 137 the 
proposed statute leaves the figure to the determination of the 
legislators. Studies indicate, however, that any figure exceeding 
$100,000 will compensate the vast majority of people for their 
noneconomic injuries, and concurrently function to provide an 
objective basis for insurance companies to determine their fu-
ture costs and corresponding insurance rates.138 
137. See supra note 24. 
138. Id. 
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In addition to the general verdict on negligence, a special in-
terrogatory is required by the statute.139 Special interrogatories 
are used to emphasize important points and prevent the jury 
from acting on the basis of bias. 140 The interrogatories ensure 
strict separation of objective economic damages and subjective 
noneconomic damages. A court is responsible for explaining the 
differences between economic and noneconomic damages and 
preparing detailed questions to ensure strict control of the 
jury.141 It thereby prevents potentially sympathetic jurors from 
inflating economic awards in order to compensate for lost 
noneconomic damages. 
Judicial review of the jury award is mandated to ensure that 
the jury faithfully fulfills its duties. Remittitur is provided for in 
the statute to allow judicial action on excessive verdicts. 142 "It is 
a universal rule . . . that a remittitur may not be granted by a 
court in lieu of a new trial unless consented to by the party 'un-
favorably affected thereby.' "143 Yet the judicial discretion to 
grant a new trial conditioned upon the acceptance of the remit-
titur is a powerful tool. 144 
In the federal system additur is unconstitutional, 1411 however, 
state law may allow it in restricted circumstances.146 To ensure 
that judges retain the power to order just compensation when 
the jury award is clearly at odds with the findings of the special 
interrogatories, the proposed statute will permit additur under 
strictly controlled circumstances for economic damages, yet deny 
increases in noneconomic damages that would exceed the statu-
tory limitation. 
139. The other elements of the statute are utilized to ensure strict compliance with 
the damage limitations. The authorities cited supra note 6 may be consulted for addi-
tional information on each element presented in the Model Statute. 
140. See Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920): 
The special verdict compels detailed consideration. But above all it enables the 
public, the parties and the court to see what the jury really has done. . . . [T]he 
special verdict enables errors to be localized so that the sound portions of the 
verdict may be saved and only the unsound portions be subject to redetermina-
tion through a new trial. 
Id. at 259. 
141. See C. WRIGHT, LAW or FEDERAL CouRTS 630-33 (4th ed. 1983). 
142. See generally Comment, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 299 (1976). 
143. United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 258 F.2d 17, 30 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959); see, e.g., 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2816 (1973). 
144. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
145. Id. at 487 (holding additur to be a violation of the right to jury trial). 
146. See Yep Hong v. Williams, 6 Ill. App. 2d 456, 128 N.E.2d 655 (1955); 11 C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 143, § 2816. 
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MODEL STATUTE 
SECTION 1: SHORT TITLE 
This Act shall be known and may be cited as Model 
Tort Liability Limitation Act. 
SECTION 2: SCOPE 
This Act shall apply to all personal injury actions in-
volving either physical or mental harm, disease, sick-
ness, and death. 
SECTION 3: DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of this Act, the subsequent terms are 
defined as follows: 
(1) "Economic damages" are objectively verifiable pe-
cuniary losses, including, but not limited to, medical 
expenses, loss of earnings, cost of replacement or re-
pair of property, cost of obtaining limited substitute 
services, burial costs, and loss of business or employ-
ment opportunities that are grounded in substantial 
actuality. The term "economic damages" shall be nar-
rowly construed by the courts. 
(2) "Noneconomic damages" are subjective, nonpecu-
niary losses, including, but not limited to, pain, suffer-
ing, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of dignity, 
physical disability or disfigurement, emotional dis-
tress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consor-
tium, and damage to the parent-child relationship. 
SECTION 4: SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 
(1) Any judgment or verdict rendered by a trier of fact 
which determines that liability exists o"n the part of 
the defendant(s) shall include specific findings of the 
following damage awards: 
(a) Prior economic damages of claimant; 
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(b) Future economic damages of claimant, including, 
but not limited to: 
(i) Medical and other costs of health care of 
claimant; and 
(ii) Lost wages or lost earning capacity of claim-
ant; and 
(iii) Cost of replacement or repair of property; 
(c) All noneconomic damages of the claimant. 
(2) When indicating the monetary sums intended to 
compensate the claimant for future losses under sub-
sections ( 1 )(b )(i) and (ii), the trier of fact shall state 
the time period for which such sums are intended to 
provide compensation. 
(3) The future damages itemized under subsections 
(l)(b) shall be computed to reflect present value. 
SECTION 5: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DAMAGE 
AWARDS 
In any action to which this Act applies, wherein the 
trier of fact finds the defendant(s) liable, and a verdict 
is rendered that awards pecuniary restitution to the 
plaintiff(s), the court shall be responsible, upon proper 
motion of either party, for reviewing the sum of the 
award to determine if the award is excessive or inade-
quate in light of the facts presented to the jury, and if 
the award could be adduced in a logical manner by 
reasonable persons. Without exception, in all circum-
stances the provisions of section 6 shall not be over-
ruled by the provisions of section 5. All judicial actions 
pursuant to this section must be entered on a written 
record by the court. 
SECTION 6: LIMITATION OF NONECONOMIC 
DAMAGES 
In any action to which this Act applies, a plaintiff 
who has been awarded damages for noneconomic 
losses, as defined in Section 3(b ), shall not recover 
monetary sums in excess of$ [insert amount]. 
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SECTION 7: EFFECTIVE DATE 
Actions subject to this Act shall apply to all claims 
that accrue after the effective enactment date of this 
Act. 
-Richard S. Kuhl 

